C16-03 The Warden as Surrogate: Statutes, Policies and Regulations Governing Decision-Making for Incapacitated Incarcerated Patients Across the United States
Abstract Rationale The United States has the highest per capita incarceration rate of any developed democracy. As the incarcerated population ages, medically complex and frail patients are increasingly hospitalized in the community, often arriving without decisional capacity and with limited family involvement. This is the first analysis of state laws and policies governing decision-making for incapacitated incarcerated patients. Methods Two team members independently conducted Westlaw and Internet searches for statutes, regulations and department of corrections (DOC) policies from 50 states and the District of Columbia, identifying language about medical decision-making for incapacitated incarcerated patients. These parallel searches were merged into a single database and reviewed by the analytic team, who created a codebook of inductively and deductively derived themes, guided by principles of grounded theory. The codebook was then systematically applied to the database by 2 independent coders; all data were double-coded. Disputes were resolved by consensus with the entire analytic team, in consultation with a legal scholar. Results Thirty-four of 51 jurisdictions have language addressing decision-making for incapacitated incarcerated patients. Data collected include the definition and determination of incapacity, language affirming incarcerated persons’ right to autonomy in medical decision-making, approaches to decision-making for patients with and without surrogate decision-makers, and whether treatment over patient/surrogate objection is authorized. Assertions about the importance of advance care planning (n = 25) are often undercut by procedural hurdles (n = 20), such as complex witnessing requirements for advance directive completion. Many jurisdictions (n = 26) allow family or friends to serve as legally recognized decision-makers. Thirteen jurisdictions exclude an incarcerated person from serving as decision-maker for another incarcerated person. Fourteen jurisdictions have provisions allowing for treatment over the objection of a patient or their surrogate. While approaches to unrepresented patients differ widely (Figure), 5 jurisdictions grant narrow decisional authority to treating physicians and 4 jurisdictions authorize correctional employees to make medical decisions. Conclusion A heterogeneous assortment of laws, policies and regulations govern the care of incapacitated incarcerated patients, with wide variation observed from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. One-third of jurisdictions lack policies or language regarding decision-making processes for incapacitated incarcerated patients. Even more troubling, 14 jurisdictions allow treatment over a patient or surrogate’s objection and 4 jurisdictions delegate authority over decisions for unrepresented patients to correctional employees, such as the prison medical director or the warden. These findings raise serious concerns about autonomy, beneficence and justice. National reform is needed to align correctional policies with established ethical standards for surrogate decision-making. This abstract is funded by: National Institute on Aging
Difficulties in Honoring Patient Requests for Hospice when Relying on Surrogate Decision-Makers: A Case Study
Abstract Honoring a patient’s wishes for end-of-life care can be challenging if the patient loses decision-making capacity and the identified alternate decision-maker will not respect the patient’s wishes. This article discusses how to proceed ethically and legally when the alternate decision-maker and care team disagree about respecting a patient’s end-of-life preferences.
US State Statutes Addressing Unilateral Clinician Decisions About Life-Sustaining Treatment
This cross-sectional study evaluates US state regulation of clinician decisions about life-sustaining treatment for adults, including justifications and regulatory requirements.
Unlocking Correctional Healthcare Policies: An Analysis of State Prison Policies Regarding the Care of Incarcerated Patients
Abstract Rationale: The US prison population carries a high burden of chronic disease and disability, with older adults constituting the fastest growing subpopulation. When medical needs exceed a prison's healthcare service capabilities, incarcerated patients are transported to clinics and hospitals in surrounding communities. The influence of prison policies on off-site medical care of incarcerated patients is poorly understood. This study aims to identify and classify correctional policies regulating the care of incarcerated patients in community hospitals. Methods: Between 6/2024-10/2024 we searched the Internet for policies from states’ Departments of Corrections (DOC) pertaining to healthcare of incarcerated patients. We compiled, reconciled and organized those policies according to date, jurisdiction and relevance to hospital care. We then developed a preliminary thematic coding scheme and, using mixed inductive and deductive content analysis, two coders independently applied our codebook to each policy. Any coding discrepancies were resolved by consensus, and when necessary, with adjudication by a third team member. Results: Forty-eight state DOCs and the District of Columbia (totaling 49 “states”) have publicly available policies pertaining to healthcare. Among these, 20/49 (41%) have policies pertaining to the protection of bodily privacy during healthcare encounters. Separately, 31 (63%) have policies regarding the confidentiality of incarcerated patients’ medical encounters and records. Thirty-four (69%) maintain policies regarding incarcerated individuals’ right to select and consent to treatment. Thirty-three (67%) include language about the right to refuse treatment. Twenty-six states (53%) direct that incarcerated individuals be informed of their right to access healthcare either in writing (22/49; 45%), verbally (20/49; 41%), or through posted signage (5/49; 10%). Twenty-one states (43%) address shackling during off-site medical care, but only 15 (31%) address responding to requests from off-site clinicians to minimize or remove patients’ restraints. Just 4/49 states (8%) use person-centered language (avoiding terms like “offender” and “inmate”). Policy excerpts addressing key domains are depicted in the Table. Conclusions: Correctional policies regarding the care of incarcerated patients in community hospitals vary significantly in scope and content across states. While incarcerated people have a Constitutionally protected right to accept or refuse healthcare, including making their own treatment decisions, many state policies do not explicitly mandate how these disclosures must be communicated to patients or their healthcare providers. These silences, when combined with security measures like shackling and the ubiquitous presence of officers, countermand person-centered care and undermine the ability of hospital healthcare professionals to uphold the rights and dignity of incarcerated patients.
Financial Toxicity in Early Phase Oncology Clinical Trials: A Review and Ethical Analysis
ABSTRACTOf the many burdens cancer patients face, the impact on personal finances is often invisible to clinicians. Financial toxicity refers to the negative impact on patients’ and families’ quality of life due to a combination of high out‐of‐pocket costs of medical treatment, diminished savings, and psychological distress as a result of diminished finances. Financial toxicity in cancer care has been more closely examined in the standard‐of‐care setting. Financial toxicity in the early phase clinical trial setting, and the ethical implications of making patients pay out of pocket to access experimental interventions that may not have therapeutic benefit, have yet to be explored. This article seeks to highlight hidden costs of clinical trial participation in the U.S., and to illustrate how patients are susceptible to financial toxicity from nonmedical direct costs and indirect costs even though a trial intervention itself is not charged to the patient. We argue that not informing prospective participants of the potential costs of trial participation threatens their autonomy and interferes with researchers’ prima facie duties to beneficence and nonmaleficence.