Sampathkumar, Priya

Background: We describe an investigation of a cluster of eight Corynebacterium amycolatum sternal surgical site infections (SSIs) that occurred among cardiac surgery patients from February to October 2025. Although C. amycolatum is a member of the skin microbiota, clinically significant infections caused by this organism may occur in cardiac surgery patients. Methods: The investigation included retrospective reviews of SSIs, clinical cultures and medical records, surgical observations, and operating room (OR) assessment. Line lists of surgical case criteria and infection prevention practices were created to assess common factors among cases (e.g., staffing, instrumentation, equipment, skin preparation and antisepsis, nasal decolonization, antibiotic protocols, and closure). Whole genome sequencing of isolates was performed and analyzed using SNIPPY for single-nucleotide polymorphism (SNP)-based phylogenetic analysis. Results: Phylogenetic analysis indicated isolates from five of eight case patients who had cardiac surgeries occurring over a six-week period from February to April 2025 were genetically related (?7 SNPs across the genome), suggesting a common source of infection. These five isolates were ceftriaxone, meropenem, and penicillin resistant. The other three case patient isolates were unrelated (<3181 to <15,000 SNPs); two were ceftriaxone, meropenem and penicillin resistant (one also doxycycline intermediate resistant), and the third penicillin resistant. Use of sternal tape for closure was identified as a recent practice change. Four of five genetically related cases involved the same surgeons and suture tape for sternal closure (wire for all other cases). Sternal tape was discontinued with three cases occurring afterwards. Seven patients completed chlorhexidine gluconate bathing and nasal decolonization. Hair was removed in the OR with reusable surgical clippers. All received the same skin antiseptic, and antibiotic prophylaxis was appropriate. No trends were identified in instrument or equipment use. Broad infection control measures were implemented, including surgical clipper replacement, OR cleaning and ultraviolet light disinfection, headlamp cleaning, and environmental repairs. Leadership was engaged through frequent meetings and audits. Infection control practices such as minimizing OR traffic, double gloving, glove changes, and strict adherence to hand hygiene and attire were reinforced. Two of eight cases occurred after these recommendations were completed but were not genetically related to the primary cluster. Conclusion: We describe a cluster of invasive C. amycolatum sternotomy SSIs. Only two genetically unrelated cases of C. amycolatum occurred following infection control investigation and interventions, underscoring the effectiveness of a comprehensive, multidisciplinary approach. This organism has rarely been reported as a cause of SSIs and may be an emerging pathogen.

Background: Measles is a highly transmissible virus. A single case can result in significant exposures within a healthcare facility and prompt action is needed to prevent secondary cases. In October 2025, Infection Prevention and Control (IPAC) was notified of a patient being admitted to our facility with recent international travel and symptoms consistent with measles. The patient was unvaccinated and had five healthcare facility visits prior to measles being suspected and subsequently confirmed. Objective: To describe our facility’s effective identification, prioritization, and prophylaxis of individuals exposed to measles. Methods: IPAC leveraged the electronic medical record to identify potentially exposed patients. Patients were quickly assessed for age and immune status, then prioritized and assigned to primary care teams. These teams promptly contacted patients and coordinated PEP administration. Results: Across five encounters, the index patient exposed 539 other patients. Due to delayed notification, our teams had less than four days to administer PEP for those exposed and still within PEP window. PEP administration began within hours of the index case’s positive test and patients received PEP within three days (Table 1). No secondary measles cases occurred within our facility. Conclusion: Timely and coordinated multidisciplinary effort enabled us to rapidly respond to our first measles case and control secondary transmission. Although the index case resulted in a large exposure, patients that were exposed and eligible for PEP were quickly prioritized to prevent secondary transmission.

Background: Advanced planning and adaptable response strategies are essential for preventing measles transmission in healthcare facilities. Objective: To describe a measles management plan and subsequent modifications in response to a cluster of measles cases. Methods: Drawing on previously published work (doi:10.1017/ice.2025.49), the Infection Prevention and Control (IPAC) team initiated a multi-disciplinary team and developed a measles preparedness plan with the following domains: Guidance and education; early detection and testing; isolation and patient movement; contact tracing and exposure management (Table 1). In October 2025, a patient was admitted during their fifth healthcare encounter and was diagnosed with measles. Two family members were later hospitalized with measles. Delayed recognition of the first case prompted enhancements to our preparedness framework (Table 1). Results: The first case resulted in 539 exposed patients. The second resulted in 87 exposures, and the third resulted in no exposure. Despite the extensive exposure, zero secondary measles were reported. Conclusion: Proactive planning enabled rapid response to our first case and controlled secondary transmission. Despite extensive planning, delayed identification of the first case caused significant exposures. As the cluster unfolded, we refined our plan, resulting in zero exposures from the last patient and zero secondary cases, despite over 850 exposures. These efforts may guide other healthcare facilities in improving their measles preparedness and response.

Background: In 2025, 50 measles outbreaks drove 87% of confirmed cases reported in the United States. As a highly infectious virus with an estimated R ranging from 12-18, we sought rapidly scalable and implementable measles preparedness measures for our facilities. Methods: The electronic health record (EHR) has flags that can be placed on patient records to denote the presence of, or concern for, active, transmissible infections. These flags are highly visible in the EHR and represent a good usability heuristic as front line providers are already trained to look for this information. Infection Prevention and Control (IPAC) worked with nursing informatics to develop measles-specific flags for suspected, confirmed and exposed patients in the EHR, expanding flagging functionality in preparation for potential measles cases and exposures. The flagging was tied to registry functionality to allow for tracking of exposed and confirmed cases longitudinally for supporting IPAC investigations in addition to clinical operations. Results: Three different flags were developed in the EHR to address measles. Specific criteria were created for each flag, as shown in Table 1. Table 1: Attached as Image Conclusion: As a highly contagious virus, measles presents unique challenges to healthcare facilities managing both cases and exposures. Measles flags within the EHR can be leveraged to assist facilities with case tracking, exposure management, and infection prevention and control.

Background: Candida auris is a globally emerging, multidrug-resistant fungal pathogen that causes serious, difficult-to-treat infections in hospitalized patients. C. auris cases in the United States have been linked to receipt of healthcare overseas. Outbreaks have also occurred in New York City, New Jersey, Illinois, Nevada, and California. We provide care to patients from all 50 states and 138 countries and are therefore, at risk for encountering C.auris within our facility. Methods: A case-finding tool was created by Infection Prevention and Control (IPAC) within the electronic medical record (EMR) to identify patients for screening. Inclusion criteria was centric to patients who were admitted in the previous 24 hours with a primary address in a foreign country or in areas of the United States with known C. auris transmission. Patients who are positive for Carbapenamase-producing organisms (CPO) are also included in screening criteria. In 2020, Clinical Microbiology validated a polymerase chain reaction (PCR) test in partnership with the State Health Department and IPAC. In January 2022, IPAC created a protocol that allows IPAC staff to order C. auris screening directly in the EMR utilizing the validated PCR test. The order is paired with communication from IPAC alerting the patient care team that C.auris screening is indicated. Instructions on test collection and information on C. auris are also included in messaging. The patient’s primary nurse then obtains verbal consent from the patient to collect a composite axilla–groin skin swab. Swabs are sent to Clinical Microbiology for testing, and results are reported directly into the EMR. Results: Since the introduction of the nursing protocol in January 2022, 2,660 patients have been identified for C. auris screening through November 2025. Of the 2,660 patients identified for testing, 1,111 patients had screening completed. Two patients tested positive for C. auris on screening. Both patients had prolonged travel to regions with known C. auris transmission. Conclusion: The EMR can be leveraged for early identification and screening of patients at risk of C.auris colonization. Case finding tools, combined with nursing protocols and communication strategies within the EMR can be effectively replicated and modified to respond to emerging infections.

Background: Carbapenemase-producing organisms (CPO) are a serious public health threat. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) guidelines for combating CPO includes a recommendation to screen selected high risk patients. We describe a program to identify and screen patients at risk for CPO. Setting: An academic, tertiary care center with 2,059 licensed beds and 74,359 admissions a year. Methods: A report was created in the electronic medical record (EMR) to identify adult patients admitted in the previous 24 hours who were from countries and states with known CPO transmission based on address and zip code. A nursing protocol was subsequently developed in the EMR to facilitate CPO screening for eligible patients at admission. After the CPO order is placed, an electronic communication is sent via the EMR alerting the patient care team of the order, the rationale for screening, details on swab collection, and links to a toolkit with resources to help answer patient questions. A single perirectal swab is obtained by the patient’s primary nurse and is tested for Klebsiella pneumoniae Carbapenemase (KPC), New Delhi metallo-β-lactamase (NDM), oxacillinase-48 (OXA-48), and Verona integron-encoded metallo-β-lactamase (VIM) by polymerase chain reaction (PCR). Patients may refuse testing. Results: From May 2018 through November 2025, 6,039 patients were identified for CPO screening using case-finding report. Of these patients, 2,424 had CPO swabs completed. Eighteen patients with CPO were identified with an overall yield of 0.75% on admission screening. There was one patient who tested positive for KPC, 10 patients who tested positive for NDM, and 5 patients who tested positive for OXA-48. Two patients were identified to have both NDM and OXA-48. Conclusions: The EMR can be leveraged for early identification and screening of patients with epidemiologically significant pathogens. Use of the nursing protocol has enabled IPAC to complete timely CPO surveillance and prevent transmission to other patients. Protocols within the EMR can be effectively replicated for a timely response to emerging infections.

ABSTRACT Blood culture contamination can lead to false-positive blood culture results, potentially contributing to increased costs and unneeded antibiotic utilization. Initial specimen diversion devices (ISDD) have been proposed to reduce blood culture contamination rates. A single-center, observational study conducted at Mayo Clinic Rochester compared blood culture contamination rates using Steripath or Kurin ISDDs versus standard blood culture collection protocols. Over 255 phlebotomists were trained in the use of the ISDDs, with 31,215 blood cultures, 410 of which were contaminated, collected from adults in the emergency department and inpatient wards. Baseline contamination rates were 1.29%–2.53% with standard collection methods. The Steripath ISDD with direct-to-media inoculation of blood culture bottles (Steripath-DTM) reduced blood culture contamination compared to standard practice (0.34% vs. 1.43%, respectively, P < 0.001). Follow-up studies with the alternative Steripath configuration with an integrated syringe (Steripath-syringe), and then the Kurin ISDD with syringe collection (Kurin-syringe), did not meet the primary endpoint of <0.5% contamination (Steripath-syringe: 1.28%; Kurin-syringe: 1.76%). All three ISDD configurations failed to meet our goal of >75% utilization, with an average measured utilization of 26% for the Steripath-DTM, 26.4% for the Steripath ISDD (combined DTM and syringe) in a follow-up study, and 41.5% in the Kurin study. Additionally, a survey of phlebotomists revealed low staff satisfaction with both Steripath ISDD configurations. Staff reported multiple ergonomic barriers limiting the Steripath ISDD’s utility, which precluded implementation of the Steripath-DTM in routine clinical practice. IMPORTANCE We conducted a very large, real-world study of two blood diversion devices to determine whether either would meet goals for reduced blood culture contamination and a high rate of utilization by phlebotomists.

Abstract This multisociety infection prevention guidance document was developed for individuals and organizations that engage in sterilization or high-level disinfection (HLD). It was endorsed by SHEA, APIC, ASGE, IDSA, and SGNA. This guidance is based on a synthesis of published scientific evidence, theoretical rationale, current practices, practical considerations, writing group consensus, and consideration of potential harm when applicable. The supplementary material includes a summary of recommendations. The guidance provides an overview of the Spaulding Classification and considerations around manufacturers’ instructions for use (MIFUs). Its recommendations address: point-of-use treatment prior to sterilization or HLD, preparation of reusable medical devices at the location of processing, sterilization, and immediate use steam sterilization (IUSS), HLD of lumened and non-lumened devices, processing of reusable medical devices used with lubricating or defoaming agents, monitoring for effectiveness of processing, handling of devices after HLD, augments and alternatives to HLD, processing of investigational devices, tracking of reusable medical devices, and approaches to implementation.

ABSTRACTIntroductionVaccination is crucial to the thoracic solid organ transplant (SOT) population to reduce vaccine‐preventable infection. However, data on posttransplant hepatitis B virus (HBV) vaccination compliance and vaccine‐induced seroprotection are lacking.MethodsWe conducted a retrospective study of adult thoracic organ (heart and lung) transplant recipients at Mayo Clinic sites in Minnesota, Arizona, and Florida between January 2018 and August 2023. Recombivax HB was used before 2020, and Heplisav‐B was preferred after 2020. Recipients with posttransplant hepatitis B surface antibody (HBsAb) < 10 IU/L were eligible for the HBV vaccine. HBV seroprotection was defined as an HBsAb ≥ 10 IU/L.ResultsA total of 1116 recipients were evaluated, all of whom underwent posttransplant HBsAb testing. Of these, 751 (67%) had an HBsAb level < 10 IU/L and were eligible for posttransplant HBV vaccination. Of the eligible recipients, 117 (16%) completed the HBV vaccine series during the study period. Among these 117 recipients, 40 (34%) had their HBsAb levels rechecked after completing the vaccine series, with a seroprotection rate of 37.5% (15/40). There was no statistically significant difference in the seroprotection rates between Heplisav‐B and Recombivax HB vaccines (39% [13/33] vs. 29% [2/7]; p = 0.691). In addition, HBsAb levels were lowest at week 2 but rebounded at week 4 posttransplant and pretransplant HBsAb levels of ≥100 IU/L ensured 5‐year seroprotection.ConclusionSuboptimal compliance with HBV vaccination and poor vaccine‐induced seroprotection occur in thoracic organ transplant recipients, regardless of the vaccine used. These findings underscore the necessity of enhancing vaccination strategies for SOT recipients. image